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ABSTRACT
Money demand and the stock of money have all but disappeared from monetary policy analyses.
This paper is an empirical contribution to the debate over the role of money in monetary policy
analysis. The paper models supply and demand interactions in the money market and finds evidence
of an essential role for money in the transmission of policy. Across sub-samples, it finds evidence
consistent with the following inferences: (1) the money stock and the interest rate jointly transmit
monetary policy; (2) for a given exogenous change in the nominal interest rate, the estimated impact
of policy on economic activity increases monotonically with the response of the money supply; (3)
the path of the real rate is not sufficient for determining policy impacts.
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1. Introduction
Money demand and the stock of money have all but disappeared from monetary
policy analyses. Reasons for the disappearance vary from the declining correlations
between conventional money measures and economic activity to the frustrating in-
stability of empirical money demand speciﬁcations. But the main reason money has
disappeared is that in the most widely used models of monetary policy, the money
stock is redundant for determining output and inﬂation once the short-term nomi-
nal interest rate is present. The near-universal adoption of interest rate instruments
by central banks, coupled with the belief that actual central bank behavior is well
modeled by a policy rule that sets the interest rate as a function of only output and
inﬂation, has led to an emphasis on theoretical models in which money supply is in-
ﬁnitely elastic [Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)]. Monetary policy without money is
so widely accepted that it now appears in pedagogical writings at the undergraduate
and graduate levels [Romer (2000), Stiglitz and Walsh (2002), or Woodford (2003)].
Even if one buys the theoretical argument that the stock of money is redundant, a
persuasive empirical case has yet to be made. This paper shows that money plays an
important role in the transmission of policy in small empirical models. In contrast to
many studies, we model the Federal Reserve’s rule for setting the Federal funds rate
as also including a broad measure of money. As long as money demand is not interest
inelastic, this implies that the money supply and the interest rate are determined
simultaneously. We show that when this simultaneity is modeled and the interest
elasticities of supply and demand for money are freely estimated, policy shocks have
signiﬁcantly larger impacts on real variables and inﬂa t i o nt h a nw h e ne i t h e rm o n e y
or the interest rate is treated recursively. Simultaneity also implies far less inertial
responses of inﬂation to policy disturbances. These ﬁndings hold across time, even in
t h ef a c eo fs i g n i ﬁcant ﬁnancial innovation and instability in empirical speciﬁcations
of short-run money demand.
Date: February 25, 2003. Prepared for Cleveland Fed/JMCB Conference, November 6-8, 2002.
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To model the money market, we pay a price in having to take a stronger stand on
money demand behavior than is typical in the identiﬁed VAR literature. But a little
economic structure goes a long way. Comparing the simultaneous model’s predictions
with those that restrict money’s role in various ways, we ﬁnd that, for a given initial
change in the nominal interest rate, the strength of the output and price eﬀects of
policy increase monotonically with the response of the money stock. Moreover, when
money and the nominal interest rate jointly transmit policy, monetary policy has
impacts that are unrelated to the path of the real interest rate. This evidence is at
odds with New Keynesian theoretical structures now in wide use for policy analysis. In
those structures, money and the short-term nominal interest rate are interchangeable,
and the real interest rate is the sole channel by which policy aﬀects real quantities
and inﬂation.
The paper also sheds light on two persistent puzzles in empirical work in monetary
policy. Those puzzles–the liquidity puzzle and the price puzzle–plague empirical
work on monetary policy. The liquidity puzzle arises when monetary policy distur-
bances fail to generate a negative short-run correlation between the nominal interest
rate and the money stock; the price puzzle arises when higher nominal rates, which
are interpreted as tighter monetary policy, are followed by higher prices for some
time. These puzzles are ubiquitous, appearing across empirical approaches. Absence
of liquidity eﬀects appears in simple correlations [Christiano (1991)], distributed-
lag regressions [Melvin (1983)], recursive VARs [Leeper and Gordon (1992)], and
identiﬁed VARs [Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2002)]. Price puzzles appear in sim-
ple correlations, distributed-lag regressions [Sargent (1973)], recursive VARs [Sims
(1992), Eichenbaum (1992)], identiﬁed VARs [Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996), Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999)], and in the narrative approach of Romer and
Romer (1989) [Leeper (1997)].
Resolutions of the two puzzles are usually treated independently. The liquidity puz-
zle has been solved by focusing on narrow monetary aggregates such as non-borrowed
reserves [Strongin (1995), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996)]. Following
Sims (1992), the price puzzle is widely regarded as arising from the inclusion of too
little information in empirical models, which confounds exogenous policy disturbances
with forecastable changes in inﬂation. Sims adds commodity prices to the monetary
authority’s information set, ameliorating the perverse price level responses. (But see
Hanson (2002) for a critical review of the commodity-price ﬁx.)
Our results indicate that the puzzles have a common source: extreme assumptions
about the interest-rate elasticity of either supply or demand in the money market. By
restricting the roles of money and interest rates in the transmission of monetary policy,
these assumptions confound monetary policy and money demand shocks. When we
estimate the elasticities freely, the puzzles disappear from U.S. data from 1959-2001
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The solution to the puzzles does not lie in merely “adding money” or other in-
formation to the model. Adding money in ways that do not isolate interactions
between money demand and monetary policy, and do not help to identify money
market supply and demand elasticities, is not suﬃcient to eliminate the anomalies. A
similar argument applies to other non-economic additions of information. This may
explain why the factor augmentation of Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2002) or the
commodity-price ﬁx of Sims (1992) diminish but do not eliminate the puzzles.
Some recent papers argue prices should rise following a monetary contraction be-
cause monetary policy has supply-side eﬀects operating through the costs of ﬁnancing
[Barth and Ramey (2001) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001)]. As Barth
and Ramey (2001) put it: “...if monetary policy does transmit its eﬀects on real
variables through a cost channel, then rising prices in the short run following a con-
tractionary policy shock are not a puzzle” [p. 229, emphasis in original]. Our results
underscore that inferences about the importance of supply-side eﬀects are not robust,
as they depend on assumptions about money market behavior.
Lastly, our ﬁndings underscore that although identiﬁed VARs may deliver very
similar qualitative predictions of the dynamic impacts of exogenous disturbances of
exogenous monetary policy disturbances, they can diﬀer substantially in their quanti-
tative predictions.
1 If quantitative predictions are not robust across equally reasonable
identiﬁcation schemes, questions arise about the eﬃcacy of an increasingly popular
methodology proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) to implement
Lucas’s (1980) research program. That methodology takes the impulse response func-
tions following a monetary policy shock from a particular identiﬁcation as oﬀering a
set of facts that theoretical models are speciﬁed to deliver.
2 But if alternative identify-
ing assumptions imply quantitatively very diﬀerent response functions, questions arise
about which set of “facts” theory should aim to reproduce. As the paper shows, the
degree of inertia in inﬂation is a particularly non-robust feature of identiﬁed VARs.
All the estimated models use a common data set: monthly data from 1959:1-2001:6
on real GDP, consumption, unemployment, the personal consumption expenditures
price deﬂator, commodity prices, and the eﬀective Federal funds rate. Models that
include money also use the M2 stock and the own rate of return on M2. Reduced-form
analyses use some of these variables as well as others to make results comparable to
earlier work.
3
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explores reduced-form
evidence for the role of money in the determination of output and inﬂation, ﬁnding
1This point is also made by the more agnostic identiﬁcation procedures of Faust (1998), Canova
and Pina (2000), and Uhlig (1997).
2Examples of papers following this methodology include Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001), Boivin and Giannoni (2002), and Trigari (2002).
3Appendix A describes the data.PUTTING ‘M’ BACK 4
that there is no consistent evidence of an independent role for money. Reduced-form
results alone, however, cannot help sort out the transmission mechanism of policy.
To do that, sections 4-6 compare diﬀerent treatments of interactions between money
and interest rates in the money market. This analysis illustrates the importance of
modeling the money market and quantiﬁes the errors that accompany a failure to
do so. As a robustness check, section 7 considers some nested models of the money
market. Section 8 checks the maintained assumption that the behavioral models’
disturbances are mutually uncorrelated. Section 9 is a more detailed look at the past
20 years. Our qualitative results obtain in recent data, although there is reason to
question how well the transmission mechanism of policy is identiﬁed in that period.
Finally, in section 10 we show that interpretations of movements in inﬂation and
unemployment over the post-World War II period vary depending on whether one
uses the lens of a model without money or the lens of a model that speciﬁes money
market behavior.
2. Reduced-Form Evidence
Before moving to identiﬁed models, it is useful to review some reduced-form evi-
dence. We start with dynamic correlations among policy and macro variables, and
then reproduce some in-sample and out-of-sample tests of the role of money.
Figure 1 shows correlations among the Federal funds rate, M2 money growth, PCE
inﬂation, and real GDP growth estimated over several sample periods. To get a
sense of how stable the relationships are, correlations are based on a 15-year moving
window of data. Although some instability emerges, unconditional correlations are
remarkably stable overall.
The funds rate is robustly negatively correlated with output growth 6 months
and 1 year ahead, and it is robustly positively correlated with inﬂation 1 year in the
future. Money growth is consistently positively correlated with inﬂation 2 years hence,
and with output growth 6 months and 1 year in the future. After being negatively
correlated contemporaneously for many years, money growth and the funds rate have
been strongly positively correlated for the past decade.
It is tempting to line these correlations up with patterns of results in identiﬁed
models. Those results include strong output eﬀects of interest rate innovations, the
price puzzle, and the liquidity puzzle. But the correlations are also broadly consistent
with the monetarist prediction that higher money growth ﬁrst raises output and,
with a lag of about 2 years, then raises inﬂation. With the presence of liquidity
and price puzzles in the ﬁgure it may appear that monetary policy impacts are not
transmitted only by a short-term interest rate or a money aggregate, but rather by
some combination of the two. We explore this possibility in the identiﬁed sections of
the paper.PUTTING ‘M’ BACK 5
One rationale for dropping money comes from reduced-form studies. Both in-
sample and out-of-sample studies often ﬁnd that money growth does not help to
predict output and inﬂation. Estrella and Mishkin (1997) and Stock and Watson
(1999) are representative of those studies. Svensson (2000) cites both of those papers
when he argues the European Central Bank should eliminate its money-growth pillar.
Table 1 extends results in Estrella and Mishkin (1997). Column 4 presents p-values
associated with Granger causality tests that all coeﬃcients on M2 growth are zero
in the ﬁrst and second equations of a VAR(9) model of {∆lnyt,∆lnpt,∆lnM2t}
for a number of data sub-samples.4 Like Estrella and Mishkin, we ﬁnd that M2
growth helps predict output growth in the full sample, but that this predictive power
disappears if we exclude the period up to 1979:10. Extending the analysis to other
sample periods yields inconsistent evidence of a role for M2: it helps predict inﬂation
in the post 1990:1 period, and output growth when 1979:10—1982:12 are excluded;
but it provides no useful information in predicting either inﬂation or output growth
when the period through 1982:12 is excluded.
Based on the unconditional correlations in Figure 1, we might expect money and
interest rates to play a joint role in determining output and inﬂation. Indeed, includ-
ing the current and lagged funds rate in the VAR often improves the predictive power
of money growth for output growth or inﬂation, but it does not do so in a consistent
manner.
Stock and Watson (1999) show that money growth also does not improve out-of-
sample forecasts of inﬂation using a Phillips curve relationship. As in Stock and
Watson, we compute out-of-sample forecasts of the change in 12-month-ahead inﬂa-
tion, πt+12, based on the estimated Phillips curve speciﬁcation:
πt+12 − πt = α + B(L)Ut + G(L)πt + εt+12, (1)
where Ut is the current rate of unemployment (or log diﬀerence of hours worked),
and B(L) and G(L) are lag polynomials. The initial forecast for 1970:1 is based on
parameters estimated from data through 1968:12, and successive forecasts are based
on in-sample estimates that are continually updated. Table 2 compares the forecast
performance of equation (1) against an alternative speciﬁcation that replaces Ut with
the growth rate of money. The ratios of the mean squared forecast errors from the
speciﬁcation with M2 growth and that with unemployment are reported in columns
2, 4, and 6. The other columns report the estimated parameter in a regression of the
actual change in inﬂation on the two forecasts:
πt+h − πt = λf
M
t +( 1− λ)f
U
t +  t+h, (2)
4Whereas Estrella and Mishkin construct a monthly coincident index of nominal activity, we
consider results for industrial production and real GDP.PUTTING ‘M’ BACK 6
where fM
t and fU
t are the h-step-ahead forecasts of π using either money growth or
the unemployment rate models estimated through time t.
A value of λ close to zero means that the forecast based on money growth adds no
predictive power beyond that based on the standard Phillips curve speciﬁcation. As
in Stock and Watson, evidence of a role for money is inconsistent, although it seems
to have more predictive power in the post-1984 period.
The bottom four rows of Table 2 report the same statistics testing the Phillips
curve forecast against a forecast based on money growth and the funds rate. Adding
the funds rate improves the forecast performance of money based on both measures
in the latter sample, but increases the out-of-sample prediction error in the ﬁrst half
of the sample.
In-sample tests tend to ﬁnd that the role of money in predicting output and inﬂation
has diminished over time. Money does not appear to matter after 1982. Out-of-sample
forecasts of inﬂation, however, seem to be improved by including money growth.
Money matters after 1983. These reduced-form tests do not oﬀer much guidance about
the role of money in monetary policy. They also do not capture the role of money
in the transmission of policy since this requires an identiﬁed model. As Estrella and
Mishkin (p. 292) note, “[T]he insigniﬁcance [of money for]...nominal income growth
and inﬂation... might be attributable to their use in smoothing ﬂuctuations in those
variables.” Thus the authors suggest that “a more careful analysis...could proceed by
formulating and estimating a policy reaction function.”
3. Econometric Approach
This section sketches the identiﬁed VAR methodology used in the rest of the paper
to estimate private and policy behavior.
Actual policy behavior is a complicated function of a high-dimensional vector of
variables. Policy makers choose an interest rate instrument, Rt, as a function of their
information set, Ωt. Actual policy is a function g such that
Rt = g(Ωt). (3)
We assume that private agents are not privy to the details of the policy makers’
decision problems, including the policy makers’ incentives and constraints. Agents
observe the information set St ⊂ Ωt. They perceive that policy is composed of a
regular response to the state of the economy that they observe at t, St, and a random
part, εP




w h e r ew et a k ef to be linear and εP
t to be exogenous to the model.PUTTING ‘M’ BACK 7
The econometric model embeds (4) in a system of equations describing private
behavior. If yt is an (m × 1) vector of time series, the structural model is
∞ X
s=0
Atyt−s = εt, (5)
where εt is a vector of exogenous i.i.d. behavioral disturbances, including policy and
non-policy shocks. To use the structural model for policy prediction, we require that
εP




t |yt−s,s>0)=I, E(εt |yt−s,s>0)=0,a l l t . (6)
Assuming the matrix of contemporaneous coeﬃcients, A0, is non-singular, there is




Csεt−s + E0yt. (7)
The elements of Cs report how each variable in y responds over time to the behavioral
disturbances in ε. E0yt is the projection of yt conditional on initial conditions. The
reduced form of (5) is
p X
s=0
Bsyt−s = ut, (8)










Identiﬁcation of the structural model follows from imposing suﬃcient restrictions on
A0 so that there are no more than m(m−1)/2 free parameters in A0. No restrictions
are imposed on lags, except in section 6.3.
In the estimates that follow all variables are logged except the unemployment rate,
the Federal funds rate, and the own rate of return on M2, which enter as percentage
points. Therefore, all interest rate elasticities are semi-elasticities. Identiﬁed models
are estimated using Sims and Zha’s (1998) Bayesian methods. We assume a lag length
of 13 months throughout.PUTTING ‘M’ BACK 8
4. Economic Evidence: Models that Omit Money
W es t a r tw i t ha ne c o n o m i cs p e c i ﬁcation in the spirit of recent theoretical work in
which the money market is not modeled. Ours is an expanded version of Rotemberg
and Woodford’s (1997) three-variable VAR model. The money stock is excluded from
the model and policy obeys a Taylor rule. As in a standard New Keynesian model,
policy is not transmitted through the money stock.
Table 3 describes the identiﬁcation of the model without money–the A0 matrix.
Sectors of the economy are depicted as columns and variables as rows. The sectors
are P (product market), I (information), and MP (monetary policy). Y is real GDP,
C is real personal consumption expenditures, U is the unemployment rate, P is the
personal consumption expenditures implicit price deﬂator, CP is commodity prices,
and R is the Federal funds rate. An × denotes a freely estimated parameter and a
blank denotes a zero restriction. Product market variables are inertial, responding
only to their own disturbances within the month.5 Information variables–commodity
prices–are determined in auction markets and respond to all news instantaneously.
Monetary policy follows a Taylor rule, adjusting the funds rate in response to current
inﬂation and output.
6 Appendix B reports the estimated coeﬃcients in the Taylor
rule.
Figure 2 reports responses to an exogenous monetary contraction for a system
estimated over the full sample period, 1959:1-2001:6. The solid line is the maximum
likelihood estimate and the dashed lines report the 68% probability band.7 The
funds rate rises initially and stays well above its original level for 2 years. Output
and consumption decline smoothly, reaching their troughs after about 18 months,
while unemployment rises and doesn’t peak for about 2 years. The model exhibits a
small price puzzle, with the price level very likely to be higher for at least 6 months.
After 6 months, the upper bound of the error bands lies on zero; any deﬂationary
eﬀects of a monetary contraction are very imprecisely estimated.
Appendix C reports impacts of a policy contraction over four sub-periods: 1959:1-
2001:6 (solid); 1959:1-1979:9 (dashed); 1959:1-1982:12 (dotted); 1959:1-2001:6, ex-
cluding 1979:10-1982:12 (solid-dotted). Qualitatively, responses of real variables are
stable over time, though they are somewhat larger in the 59-79 sub-period. Price
level impacts exhibit substantial instability, and they all display a small price puzzle
in the short run, consistent with Hanson (2002). The 59-79 and 59-01 (excluding
79-82) periods have chronic puzzles, with a policy contraction permanently raising
the price level.
5Sims (1998b, 2001) discusses why product markets may be inertial.
6This is a generalized Taylor rule that imposes no restrictions on lags.
7We use Sims and Zha’s (1999) procedure for computing error bands with a Gibbs sampler
algorithm based on 300,000 draws [Waggoner and Zha (2003a,b)].PUTTING ‘M’ BACK 9
Table 6 reports that for the 1959-2001 period the model’s overidentifying restric-
tions are rejected by both a likelihood ratio test and the Akaike information criterion
(AIC). Data slightly favor the unrestricted model by the Schwarz criterion (SC).
This pattern holds across most sub-periods, except that the SC favors the restricted
model. The recent period, 1983:1-2001:6, which is discussed in section 9, is diﬀerent:
the restrictions are not rejected by any test.
This model includes past, but not current, commodity prices in the policy rule.
Following Hall’s (1996) suggestion, we can allow commodity prices to enter the rule
contemporaneously, but with a “soft zero” restriction. Soft zeros are a prior on CP
with a zero mean, but a non-degenerative distribution, so if the data strongly support
a response of policy to CP, the posterior parameters will reﬂect it. Doing this tends
to resolve the anomalous response of prices, but the real eﬀects of policy become much
smaller and more transitory.
Although commodity prices may help resolve an empirical puzzle–though see Han-
son’s (2002) careful analysis for a diﬀerent conclusion–it raises the theoretical puzzle
of exactly what role information about commodity prices is playing in policy choices.
Sims (1992) argues commodity prices provide the Fed with information about future
inﬂation, possibly generated by real disturbances, but there is little direct evidence
establishing that link. Moreover, the role of commodity prices has not been well
worked out in theoretical models. For these reasons, we are not very satisﬁed with
giving commodity prices a prominent role in identifying monetary policy behavior.
We turn now to modeling money market behavior and ﬁnd that this resolves the
two key empirical anomalies mentioned in the introduction without the contrivance
of commodity prices.
5. Economic Evidence: Models with Money
In the previous model with a Taylor rule for policy, the money stock imposes no
restrictions on the estimates of policy impacts. Implicitly, the model assumes money
is supplied elastically to clear the money market at prevailing prices. Rather than
impose money supply is inﬁnitely elastic with respect to the interest rate, this section
models money market behavior and estimates supply and demand elasticities directly.
5.1. Why Include Money? There are several reasons why money may not be re-
dundant, given interest rates. Although Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) show that
a Taylor (1993) rule is nearly optimal in the context of a standard New Keynesian
model, Collard and Dellas (Undated) and Canova (2000) suggest this result may
not be robust. Those papers ﬁnd that a policy rule that incompletely accommodates
money demand shocks yields somewhat higher welfare than does a Taylor rule. More-
over, if volatile real money balances–or a volatile ﬁnancial sector more generally–are
costly to society, it is not likely that setting the interest rate independently of moneyPUTTING ‘M’ BACK 10
growth will be even nearly optimal. Ireland (2001a,b) ﬁnds empirical support for
including money growth in the interest rate rule for policy. Using maximum like-
lihood to estimate a standard New Keynesian model, he ﬁnds that U.S. data favor
having both inﬂation and money growth enter the interest rate rule. This ﬁnding
holds for both pre-1979 and post-1979 samples of data. In this case, money plays an
informational role by helping to forecast future nominal interest rates.
Practical considerations also suggest including money in the Fed’s policy rule. If
the Fed does not have contemporaneous information on inﬂation and output, but
it does have observations on the money stock, then money may help the Fed infer
current values of the variables it cares about directly. Coenen, Levin, and Wieland
(2001) show that when output and price data are measured with error and subject
to revision, money can help to predict current realizations of these variables. These
points are particularly relevant in small empirical models, which approximate the
Fed’s information set with a short list of variables.
Nelson (2002) oﬀers an alternative role for money. He posits that money demand
depends on a long-term interest rate. Because long rates matter for aggregate demand,
t h ep r e s e n c eo fal o n gr a t ei nm o n e yd e m a n da m p l i ﬁes the eﬀects of changes in
the stock of money on real aggregate demand. Nelson’s speciﬁcation of the Fed’s
interest rate rule is a dynamic generalization of the conventional Taylor rule–money
is excluded. Money now has a direct eﬀect that is independent of the short-term
interest rate, an eﬀect that Nelson argues U.S. data support.
5.2. A Model of the Money Market. As long as money enters the Fed’s policy
rule, it is crucial to model the interaction of policy and money demand in order to
identify the transmission mechanism of policy. This leads to simultaneity between
money and interest rates [Gordon and Leeper (1994), Leeper and Zha (2001)]. We
posit a simple form for the simultaneity. Table 4 summarizes the contemporaneous
restrictions in A0. To the model in Table 3 we add money demand behavior, MD,a n d
another information variable, the own rate of return on money. As before, product
markets are inertial and respond with a one-month lag to shocks from information or
monetary sectors.
For compactness, we forego modeling the details that link markets for reserves and
broad monetary aggregates. Demand for nominal M2 depends, as it does in many
general equilibrium models, on consumption and the price level. It also depends on the
opportunity cost of M2, which we take to be the spread between the funds rate and the
o w nr e t u r no nM 2 ,RM. An ×1 in Table 4 denotes a linear restriction on the relevant
coeﬃcients: R−RM enters the money demand function with a single free coeﬃcient.
Monetary policy responds only to the money stock contemporaneously, even though
the Fed also has current information on commodity prices. This limits simultaneityPUTTING ‘M’ BACK 11
in the money market to that between money and interest rates. Appendix B reports
the estimated coeﬃcients on money demand and the policy rule.
Figure 3 reports the dynamic impacts of an exogenous monetary contraction. On
impact the funds rate rises and the money stock falls substantially: a 25 basis-point
increase in R is associated with a 2.7% annual rate decrease in money growth. The
liquidity eﬀect is short-lived, however, lasting only 8 months; within 18 months, the
funds rate is signiﬁcantly lower. An expected inﬂation eﬀe c tt h a td o m i n a t e st h e
liquidity eﬀect is a feature of this model that is completely absent from the model
that omits money. The money stock continues to decline smoothly over the 4-year
horizon.
There is no price puzzle. After the imposed one-period delay, the price level declines
and continues to decline over the horizon; it is signiﬁcantly lower within about 8
months. Price impacts are very precisely estimated, with the 68% band below 0
throughout. This path seems consistent with the brief liquidity eﬀect followed by a
dominant expected inﬂation eﬀect that the funds rate exhibits.
Qualitatively the real eﬀects are similar to those in the model that omits money.
But the quantitative impacts are substantially larger, as section 6 explores.
Appendix D reports policy impacts over four sub-periods. Responses of variables
are qualitatively similar across time with the exception of the own rate of return on
M2 in 59-79, a period when the own rate was not market determined. As in Appendix
C, 59-79 exhibits somewhat larger impacts.
A likelihood ratio test rejects the overidentifying restrictions with p = .005 (Table
6). The SC favors the restricted model, while the AIC prefers the unrestricted model.
A similar pattern holds in other sample periods, except for 1983:1-2001:6, where the
restrictions are not rejected by any test.
6. A Joint Role for ‘M’ and ‘R’
This section lays out detailed evidence that money and interest rates jointly trans-
mit policy. It starts by contrasting the quantitative results from the models with
and without money, drawing implications for currently popular theoretical monetary
models.8 We then turn to the importance of assumptions about contemporaneous
interactions in the money market, controlling for lagged money eﬀects. We compare
a variety of models that diﬀer only in terms of the restrictions they impose on the
interest elasticities of money demand and money supply. Finally the section looks
at the dynamic role of money by examining the eﬀects of selective exclusion of past
money market variables, while allowing unrestricted contemporaneous interactions in
the money market.
8Section 7 considers versions of the policy rules that are nested.PUTTING ‘M’ BACK 12
6.1. Models With and Without Money. Table 7 extracts some key quantitative
implications from the model without money (Table 3) and the model with money
(Table 4). For a standardized exogenous policy shift that raises the funds rate by 25
basis points, the table reports the maximum eﬀects over 4 years on output, consump-
tion, unemployment, inﬂation, and the ex-post real interest rate.
9 It also reports the
eﬀects on the price level and the money stock after 4 years. Looking ﬁr s ta tt h ef u l l
sample period, with the important exception of the real interest rate, the model in
which both M and R transmit policy generates real eﬀe c t s2t o3t i m e sb i g g e ra n d
inﬂation eﬀects more than 4 times larger. After 4 years, the price level is 9 times
lower when the money market is modeled than when behavior in the market is left
unspeciﬁed.
The pattern that eﬀects from the model with money are substantially larger than
from the model without money holds across sub-periods of the data.10 Diﬀerences
are less marked for the recent period, 1983:1-2001:6, a topic we revisit in section 9.
An important reason for the diﬀerences between the two models lies with money
demand. Figure 4 reports responses to exogenous increases in money demand. The
demand shock has a very small eﬀect on the money stock, but raises the funds rate and
the own rate of return dramatically. Both rates remain high for an extended period.
The demand shock also predicts signiﬁcantly higher prices for a time. The positive
correlation between interest rates and future inﬂation, which Figure 1 reports, gets
attributed to money demand disturbances in this model. In contrast, in the model
that omits money, the correlation is attributed to monetary policy shocks, creating the
price puzzle. This evidence suggests that the model that omits money may confound
monetary policy and money demand shocks. Demand shocks also produce non-trivial
movements in output, consumption, and especially unemployment. Evidently, money
demand disturbances are an important source of variation for which models that omit
money cannot explicitly account.
That increases in money demand should raise the price level runs counter to text-
book analyses when the money stock is exogenous. But it is commonplace in mod-
els with interest rate rules for policy. Consider a policy rule of the sort that Ire-
land (2001b) estimates: Rt = αππt + αµ
Mt
Mt−1, where the coeﬃcients are positive and
απ + αµ > 1. Embedding this rule in a New Keynesian model with a conventional
calibration of parameters, an exogenous increase in money demand raises the real
interest rate brieﬂy, but then lowers it. Because output depends on the entire future
9The ex-post real rate is computed as rt = Rt −πt. Maximum eﬀects are restricted to those that
are “correctly” signed, meaning that a contraction lowers y,c,p and M and raises U. Az e r oe n t r y
means the entire impulse response function was anomalous.
10In the period 1959:1-1979:9 the maximum eﬀect on the real rate of the model with money is
twice that of the model without money. But this arises from a single month, rather than from a
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path of real rates, output falls initially and then rises. The price level, which depends
on the entire path of the output gap, rises to a new higher level.
Figure 5 compares the impacts of policy contractions in the two models. The
contractions are normalized to raise the funds rate 25 basis points initially. Responses
for the model with money appear in the solid and dashed lines (68% error bands) and
responses for the model that omits money appear in the dotted solid lines. Exogenous
shifts in policy produce a striking pattern of results following a policy contraction:
the real interest rate paths (labeled r) are nearly identical across the two models,
but the model with money has eﬀects on real quantities and the price level that are
substantially larger over the four-year horizon. The paths of the funds rate itself
also diﬀer across the models. When money is absent, the policy shock generates a
persistent liquidity eﬀect and no expected inﬂation eﬀect. In the model with money,
in contrast, the liquidity eﬀect lasts well under a year and the expected inﬂation eﬀect
becomes important after 18 months.
If money enters the policy rule, as it does in the model with money, then these
results present a challenge to monetary theorists. They are inconsistent with theoret-
ical models now in wide use for monetary policy analysis [Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1999), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)]. The evidence appears to contradict the
prevalent monetary transmission mechanism in which the real interest rate is the sole
channel by which policy aﬀects real quantities and inﬂation.
6.2. Alternative Models of Money Market Behavior. The above section com-
pares two extremes: a model which allows for nearly unrestricted contemporaneous
and lagged money eﬀects; and a model in which money is omitted entirely. We now
focus more narrowly on four alternative models of money market behavior, controlling
for lagged money eﬀects.
The benchmark is the model with money described in Table 4, whose policy impacts
appear in Figure 3. Three other models, which are drawn from existing literature,
are identical to the benchmark except in their assumptions about short-run money
demand and monetary policy behavior. Table 5 repeats the description of the bench-
mark, model A, and describes the other models. The three models, which diﬀer in
their interest elasticities, include: inﬁnitely elastic money supply, model B [Taylor
(1993)]; inelastic money demand, model C [some models in Leeper, Sims, and Zha
(1996) and Sims (1998a)]; inelastic money supply, model D [Cochrane (1994)]. The
four models have identical lagged coeﬃcients and identical restrictions in all equations
except monetary policy and money demand.
The four models imply four diﬀerent pairs of interest elasticities of supply and
demand–some estimated, some imposed. The four elasticity pairs produce four sets
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25 basis points on impact. Table 8 summarizes those impacts across various sub-
periods. Model A estimates interest semi-elasticities of supply and demand, while
models B-D make diﬀerent extreme assumptions about elasticities. Benchmark model
A consistently ﬁnds short-run (monthly) semi-elasticities of demand that are negative
and of supply that are positive. The demand semi-elasticity is smallest in the 1983:1-
2001:6 period, which is where the supply semi-elasticity is the largest.
When an inﬁnite supply elasticity is imposed (model B), estimates of demand
elasticities tend to fall by more than an order of magnitude relative to their estimates
in model A. Tiny demand elasticities produce tiny liquidity eﬀects from exogenous
shifts in policy under interest rate rules. If money demand is assumed to be interest
inelastic (model C), supply elasticities are consistently negative and, by assumption,
the liquidity eﬀect is zero. The biggest demand elasticities emerge when supply is
inelastic (model D).
The size of the policy impacts, recorded in columns 2-8, are monotonically in-
creasing in the magnitude of the response of money supply to the normalized policy
disturbance. And the money supply response is increasing in the estimated interest
elasticity of money demand. The biggest impacts come from model D, where supply
is inelastic, and the smallest come from model C, where demand is inelastic. Policy
eﬀects under a Taylor rule (model B) are modest, lying near those when demand is
inelastic. Benchmark model A generates eﬀects that are several times larger than
models B and C, but substantially smaller than model D.
Figure 6 makes clear the divergence of policy impacts in the benchmark and the
Taylor rule models (A and B), estimated over the full sample. Solid and dashed lines
pertain to model A; solid-dotted lines to model B. Eﬀects on output, consumption,
and unemployment are much larger in model A, with model B’s responses often lying
fully outside the 68% error bands. Price eﬀects under a Taylor rule are tiny; except
for the ﬁrst few periods, they also lie well outside the error band for the benchmark
model. Indeed, it is two years before a policy contraction has any discernible eﬀect
on prices, a result consistent with several models that Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (1999) report. Small price eﬀects of monetary policy disturbances are also
consistent with ﬁndings in estimated New Keynesian models [Ireland (2001b), Cho
and Moreno (2002)]. Impacts under a Taylor rule are remarkably close to those in the
model that omits money entirely (see Table 7 and Figure 2). This underscores the
crucial role played by assumptions about contemporaneous interactions in the money
market.
One of the more frequently cited facts to emerge from identiﬁed VARs is that
inﬂation exhibits substantial inertia following a policy shock–far more inertia than
is present in monetary models with the sticky price mechanisms proposed by Taylor
(1980), Rotemberg (1982), or Calvo (1983). As reﬂe c t e di nF i g u r e6 ,i n ﬂation is very
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model. Even though inﬂation is not permitted to respond instantly to a policy shock,
it falls signiﬁcantly just two months after the shock.
11 Inﬂation behavior appears to
be a particularly non-robust feature of identiﬁed VARs.
It is diﬃcult to reconcile this pattern of results with the view that money is redun-
dant given the nominal interest rate. Moreover, if any of models B-D, which impose
elasticities, were consistent with the data, model A, which estimates supply and de-
mand elasticities jointly, should recover estimates close to the imposed values. This
doesn’t happen in any sample periods.
Table 6 shows that model A (the benchmark) and model D (inelastic money supply)
are slightly favored by the data, compared with the models that impose inﬁnitely
elastic supply or inelastic demand for money. But the diﬀerences are not too striking
and the SC consistently favors all the restricted models over the unrestricted ones.
6.3. Selective Exclusion of M and RM from Lags. Section 6.2 contrasted four
models that diﬀer only in their assumptions about contemporaneous interactions in
the money market (the elements of A0 associated with monetary policy and money
demand). This section contrasts models that diﬀer only in whether lagged values
of money market variables–M and RM–enter various product market equations.
Whereas section 6.2 focused on impact eﬀects on monetary policy, this section con-
centrates on lagged eﬀects of M and RM in transmitting policy. Each model imposes
identical identifying restrictions–those in the benchmark model (Table 4).
Table 9 reports the impacts of a policy contraction that raises the funds rate by
25 basis points in four models: the benchmark, where no exclusion restrictions are
imposed on lags of M and RM; a model that excludes M and RM from the price level
equation; a model that excludes the variables from the real variables’ equations–
output, consumption, and unemployment; and a model that excludes M and RM
from all product market equations. With only a few exceptions, real and inﬂation
impacts fall by a factor of about three when M and RM are excluded from the Y,C,
and U equations. The cumulative eﬀects on the price level and money stock fall by
2t o3t i m e sw h e nM and RM are excluded from the entire product market. These
patterns hold across sub-periods, though they are less pronounced in recent data.
The importance of lagged money market variables in transmitting policy shocks
seems at odds with reduced-form evidence. Equation-by-equation F tests in Table
1 display no consistent pattern in whether money growth predicts output and inﬂa-
tion. In contrast, the multivariate results in Table 9 suggest that past money market
variables play a consistent and non-trivial role in transmitting policy.12
11The 68% error band for inﬂation that is implied by Figure 6 lies entirely below zero from 2-48
months after the shock.
12Because the Bayesian prior allows for unit roots and cointegration, the VAR could estimate a
cointegrating relation linking a stationary velocity process to a linear combination of money growth,
inﬂation, and output growth, even though the variables enter the VAR in log levels.PUTTING ‘M’ BACK 16
Taken together, results in sections 6.2 and 6.3 paint a complex picture of the
transmission mechanism. Joint movements in M and R constitute the initial impact
of a policy shock and their lagged values jointly propagate policy to product market
variables.
7. Some Nested Monetary Models
We showed in sections 5 and 6 that models in which money enters the policy rule,
so that money and interest rates are determined simultaneously, consistently imply
substantially larger impacts of monetary policy shocks than do models that omit
money all together or treat money as determined recursively after output, inﬂation,
and the nominal interest rate are determined. Because the models discussed above
are not nested, it is diﬃcult to discern whether it is the simultaneous determination
of money and interest rates per se, or merely the diﬀerent interest rate rules that
produce the larger estimated policy impacts.
In this section we compare three models of the money market: models A and B
of Table 5 and a third model that nests those two. The third model diﬀers from A
and B only by generalizing the policy rule to allow the nominal rate to respond to
output, the price level, and the money stock. Model A restricts the general model by
zeroing out Y and P; model B restricts it by zeroing out M. Table 10 reports these
restrictions.
Figure 7 reports the responses to a monetary policy shock that raises the funds rate
by 25 basis points initially for the model with the generalized policy rule (solid line
with dashed error bands). Superimposed on those responses are the impacts in model
B, which excludes M from the policy rule (dotted solid line). Supply and demand
behavior are not well identiﬁed under the generalized policy rule: even the short-run
impacts of policy on the funds rate are very imprecisely estimated and all the error
bands are substantially wider than in model A in Figure 3. Nonetheless, the maximum
likelihood estimates in model B are much smaller than under the generalized rule.
The price level eﬀects are so much smaller in model B that they lie outside the error
bands. Model B’s extremely inertial inﬂation does not hold up under the generalized
policy rule.
Figure 8 shows the impacts of a policy shock for model A, which used the policy
rule R = f(M), along with responses for the model with the generalized rule (dotted
solid lines). These two models produce quantitatively similar policy impacts, with the
point estimates under the generalized rule frequently within the error bands for model
A. If anything, the generalized rule implies still larger impacts of policy disturbances.
Including money in the policy rule consistently ampliﬁes the eﬀects of policy shocks
and makes the response of inﬂa t i o nm u c hl e s si n e r t i a l .
Taken together the two ﬁgures support our focus on model A, rather than on the
model with the generalized rule. Policy impacts are very close in the two models, andPUTTING ‘M’ BACK 17
both are substantially diﬀerent from the model that excludes M from the policy rule.
In addition, behavior in model A is more sharply identiﬁed and the dynamic impacts
are more precisely estimated.
8. Correlations Among Exogenous Shocks
A maintained assumption in the structural models we estimate is that the exoge-
nous shocks are mutually uncorrelated [see equation (6)]. Because the models are
overidentiﬁed, there is no guarantee this assumption holds in the estimates. We use
a small-sample procedure to assess the assumption. For each draw from the poste-
rior distribution of the model’s parameters, we compute the sequence of exogenous
disturbances implied by the data; then we calculate the correlation matrix for the
sequences. Table 11 reports 68% probability intervals for correlations between MP
and MD shocks and other shocks for the model without money (section 4) and the
model with money (section 5).
Over the full sample, both models violate the maintained assumption. Monetary
policy and money demand shocks are correlated with product market disturbances in
both models.13 In the period that excludes 79:10-82:12, policy shocks in the model
with money are uncorrelated with all non-policy shocks. Money demand disturbances
continue to be correlated with product market shocks, but the probability interval is
substantially narrower and closer to including zero. The model without money does
not perform any better when the period of reserves targeting is omitted.
Identiﬁcation problems plague both models, though monetary policy seems better
identiﬁed in the model that includes money. Money demand, which plays a key role
in diﬀerentiating the two models, appears to contain a cyclical component that is not
captured by conventional money demand speciﬁcations, even when lagged variables
enter in an unrestricted manner.
9. The Recent Period
Although many economists have strong prior beliefs about the stability of mone-
tary policy behavior over time, we believe the issue is unsettled. Bernanke and Mihov
(1998a,b) test the stability of the reduced-form coeﬃcients and residual covariances
in VARs and conclude the coeﬃcients are stable but the covariances exhibit breaks in
late 1979/early 1980 and between early 1982 and early 1988. Sims’s (1999) regime-
switching reaction function estimates conﬁrm this: most of the improvement in ﬁt
from parameter variation comes from variation in the size of the errors in the pol-
icy rule, rather than from variation in the coeﬃcients of the rule. Also in a VAR
framework, Hanson (2001) ﬁnds signiﬁcant change in the variance of policy shocks
13Because separate behavioral relations in product markets are not identiﬁed, we can conclude
only that the money market disturbances are correlated with some linear combination of behavioral
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before and after the Volcker period. But he ﬁnds little evidence that the policy rule
has changed. Sims and Zha (2002) ﬁta ni d e n t i ﬁed VAR, allowing for certain types
of parameter variation over time. They ﬁnd no evidence of permanent changes in
monetary policy regime of the kind Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Taylor
(1999) emphasize in their single-equation estimates of Taylor rules.
14 Sims and Zha
conclude: “The story that policy has changed drastically between the 60-78 period
and the 83-2000 period does not seem to be borne out (p. 13).” Signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in inference about the stability of policy behavior can emerge from multivariate and
single-equation analyses.
Despite this multivariate evidence that post-82 policy behavior has not been wholly
diﬀerent from pre-79 behavior, in this section we focus on the sub-period 1983:1-
2001:6. There is good reason to be skeptical of inferences about policy behavior
drawn solely from this sub-period. Because the data are not very informative, it is
diﬃcult to identify and estimate money market behavior.
Figure 9 superimposes responses for the model without money (dotted solid lines)
over responses for the benchmark model with money, along with the monetary model’s
68% error bands (solid and dashed lines). Maximum likelihood estimates of policy
impacts on output in the model with money are at some points nearly twice as large
as those in the model without money, but the price level impacts are only slightly
larger. However, all the impacts on product market variables and nominal and real
interest rates when money is omitted lie within the monetary model’s error bands,
indicating that the eﬀects of policy may not be well identiﬁed by either model.
It is disturbing that both models exhibit small price puzzles, a problem that didn’t
arise in the model with money in other sub-periods. This is another symptom of
identiﬁcation problems. Importantly, the price puzzle in the model with money is as-
sociated with a substantially smaller liquidity eﬀect and a smaller estimated elasticity
of money demand (model A in Table 8) than in other sub-periods.
A further indicator that behavior is not well identiﬁed lies in the correlations among
shocks in this sub-period. Monetary policy shocks for the model without money are
positively correlated with errors in the equations for consumption and unemployment.
In the model with money, policy disturbances are positively correlated with errors
in the unemployment and price level equations, while money demand shocks are
negatively correlated with unemployment errors.
Conventional tests of ﬁt, reported in Table 6 cannot reject any of the restricted
models over this period. Evidently, sampling error is suﬃcient to make statistical
criteria for model selection unhelpful. While we do not dismiss the possibility that
post-1983 constitutes a distinct policy regime, it is clear that it is extraordinarily
diﬃcult to reliably estimate policy eﬀects from that period.
14Lubik and Schorfheide (2002) use maximum likelihood to estimate a New Keynesian model and
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10. Interpreting History
Interpretations of economic history and policy’s role in it depend on how money
is modeled. Comparing the model without money to the model with money, which
freely estimates money demand and supply elasticities, yields important diﬀerences
in the estimated real and nominal eﬀects of policy.
Figure 10 plots realized inﬂation (the solid line) against the implied path of in-
ﬂation after extracting the eﬀects of shocks to monetary policy or money demand
(the dotted line).15 The gap between the actual and implied series represents the
eﬀects on inﬂation of current and past exogenous policy or money demand shocks.16
During the run-up in inﬂa t i o ni nt h el a t e1 9 7 0 ’ s ,b o t ht h em o d e lw i t hm o n e y( t o p
panel) and the model without money (bottom panel) attribute part of the rise in
inﬂation to the eﬀects of exogenous monetary policy, with the magnitude of the eﬀect
somewhat greater in the model with money. The implication is that, had the mone-
tary authorities at the time acted in a manner consistent with their average behavior
historically, inﬂation would have been as much as 2 percentage points lower. The
models diverge, however, in how they account for the decline in inﬂation beginning
in the early 1980’s. Whereas the model with money shows exogenous policy to have
had a substantial disinﬂationary eﬀect, the model without money ascribes little of
t h ed e c l i n et oe x o g e n o u sp o l i c y .
Many of the diﬀerences between the policy impacts in the two models are ex-
plained by the contributions of exogenous shifts in money demand in the model with
money (middle panel of Figure 10). From 1964-1974 money demand shocks steadily
contributed to lower inﬂation rates; the model without money attributes the lower
inﬂation to monetary policy shocks. Similar results obtain around the 1980 peak of
inﬂation.
It appears likely that when money is omitted, monetary policy and money de-
mand shocks are confounded. This interpretation is consistent with the pattern of
correlations among shocks reported in Table 11: correlation with the shock from the
unemployment equation is attributed to money demand in the model with money
and to monetary policy in the model without money.
Diﬀerences between the two models also emerge in the most recent period. In the
model with money, policy shocks pushed inﬂation higher in the 1990’s and, to a lesser
extent, in 2000 and 2001. The model without money shows that policy shocks had
smaller positive contributions through 1998 and then brought inﬂation down through
15To extract the eﬀects of policy, we performed a historical decomposition of each estimated model
assuming information known at the beginning of the sample. At each point in time we subtract the
cumulative eﬀects of the series of implied policy shocks up to that point.
16Because we are subtracting out the cumulative eﬀects, it is inappropriate to characterize policy
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t h ee n do ft h es a m p l e . T h e s ed i ﬀerences arise even though money demand shocks
appear to have had little eﬀect on inﬂa t i o ni nt h er e c e n tp e r i o d .
Substantial diﬀerences across the models arise about the eﬀects of policy on unem-
ployment during the period from around 1975 to the early 1990’s (Figure 11). While
exogenous policy was eﬀective in helping to lower unemployment by more than 1 per-
centage point in the late 1970’s according to the model without money, it had little
eﬀect in the model with money. At the peak rate of unemployment in 1984, the model
without money estimates exogenous policy to have contributed nearly 2 percentage
points to unemployment, whereas the model with money shows little inﬂuence.
11. Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented a variety of evidence that the money stock and the short-
term nominal interest rate jointly transmit monetary policy in the United States.
Although reduced-form evidence tells no consistent story about the role of money in
monetary policy, the tale that multivariate structural evidence weaves is clear. A
short-run liquidity eﬀect–even one lasting less than a year–is the essential initial
stage of the transmission process. When a monetary contraction that raises the
Federal funds rate does not also generate a substantial contemporaneous decline in
the money stock–a liquidity puzzle–there is also a tendency for the price level to rise
for a time–a price puzzle. Our ﬁndings link the two puzzles: a signiﬁcant liquidity
eﬀect involving the funds rate and a suﬃciently broad monetary aggregate resolve the
price puzzle. Moreover, when monetary policy generates signiﬁcant joint movements
in money and the interest rate, real and inﬂation impacts of policy are larger than
when money’s response is small. The ﬁndings also carry an important challenge
for currently fashionable theoretical models of monetary policy: some impacts of
monetary policy on economic activity are not captured by the path of the real interest
rate.
We obtain these results from modeling supply and demand in the money market
and freely estimating interest elasticities in that market. This approach contrasts
with other empirical speciﬁcations, such as Taylor rules and many identiﬁed VARs,
which impose one elasticity and estimate the other. Those imposed elasticities could
have been recovered by our estimates. They were not.
Careful modeling of the money market interactions–a subject that has received
little attention in the identiﬁed VAR literature–is crucial to our understanding of the
dynamic eﬀects of monetary policy. We can learn nothing about these interactions
from further attempts to estimate monetary policy and money demand separately.PUTTING ‘M’ BACK 21
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Appendix A. Data
All data are monthly from 1959:1-2001:6. All series except interest rates and com-
modity prices are seasonally adjusted.
Y : real GDP interpolated using procedure Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996) describe
or industrial production (source: Federal Reserve Board);
C : personal consumption expenditures deﬂated by PCE implicit price deﬂator
(source: Bureau of Economic Analysis);
U : civilian unemployment rate (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics)
hours : non-farm employee hours (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics)
P : personal consumption expenditures implicit price deﬂator (source: Bureau of
Economic Analysis) or consumer price index, all items (source: Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics) or CPI (all urban consumer price index ; source: Bureau of Labor Statistics)
CP : KR-CRB spot commodity price index, raw industrials (source: Commodity
Research Bureau);
M : M2 money stock (source: Federal Reserve Board);
RM : deposit-weighted own rate of return on M2 (source: Federal Reserve Board);
R : Federal funds rate, eﬀective rate (source: Federal Reserve Board).





















+1 9 4 .68R
(188.59,200.86)
= εMP
Maximum likelihood estimates; .68 probability intervals in parentheses.
εMP : monetary policy shock; εMD : money demand shockPUTTING ‘M’ BACK 26
Appendix C. Sub-Sample Stability in Model Without Money
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Appendix D. Sub-Sample Stability in Model With Money
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Table 1. In-Sample Tests of Role for Money
G r a n g e rC a u s a l i t yT e s t sf o rP r e d i c t i v eP o w e ro fM o n e y
(g,π,µ)
1 (g,π,R,µ)1
p R2 p R2
Output Growth RGDP 0.023 0.400 0.131 0.430
IP 0.001 0.258 0.001 0.280
1959:01 - 2001:6 Inﬂation PCE 0.482 0.876 0.242 0.881
CPI 0.463 0.824 0.136 0.838
Funds Rate RGDP/PCE 0.413 0.995
IP/CPI 0.306 0.995
Output Growth RGDP 0.255 0.403 0.083 0.498
IP 0.414 0.216 0.075 0.280
1979:10-2001:6 Inﬂation PCE 0.223 0.836 0.332 0.843
CPI 0.258 0.801 0.277 0.823
Funds Rate RGDP/PCE 0.047 0.998
IP/CPI 0.039 0.998
Output Growth RGDP 0.607 0.477 0.738 0.497
IP 0.891 0.271 0.971 0.317
1983:1-2001:6 Inﬂation PCE 0.365 0.782 0.123 0.808
CPI 0.386 0.780 0.317 0.795
Funds Rate RGDP/PCE 0.275 0.999
IP/CPI 0.198 0.999
Output Growth RGDP 0.292 0.627 0.426 0.650
IP 0.539 0.382 0.572 0.459
1990:1-2001:6 Inﬂation PCE 0.015 0.747 0.001 0.781
CPI 0.120 0.815 0.063 0.838
Funds Rate RGDP/PCE 0.199 0.999
IP/CPI 0.007 1.000
Output Growth RGDP 0.008 0.429 0.040 0.447
IP 0.001 0.276 0.006 0.326
1959:1 - 2001:6 Inﬂation PCE 0.200 0.853 0.040 0.864
(ex. 79:10-82:12) CPI 0.342 0.782 0.036 0.802
Funds Rate RGDP/PCE 0.012 0.998
IP/CPI 0.017 0.998
p-values correspond to the F-statistic testing that lags of money growth are zero
in the output growth, inﬂation, (and in the last two columns) funds rate equations
from VAR(9) model. R2 statistics are for the unrestricted equations. Systems based
on M2 and either real GDP (RGDP) and the personal consumption expenditure
deﬂator (PCE) or industrial production (IP) and the consumer price index (CPI).
1g =l n ( Yt/Yt−1);π =l n ( Pt/Pt−1);µ =l n ( Mt/Mt−1); R= Federal Funds RatePUTTING ‘M’ BACK 29




2 Rel. MSE1 λ
2 Rel. MSE1 λ
2
(U,CPI) 1.18 0.17 1.23 0.0018 1.08 0.39
(0.10) (0.15) (0.13) (0.22) (0.10) (0.14)
(hours,CPI) 1.16 0.21 1.22 0.04 1.04 0.44
(0.10) (0.15) (0.12) (0.21) (0.11) (0.15)
(U,PCE) 1.21 0.15 1.27 0.02 1.10 0.34
(0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.18) (0.09) (0.12)
(hours,PCE) 1.21 0.13 1.30 -0.06 1.05 0.42
(0.10) (0.13) (0.14) (0.19) (0.08) (0.13)
(U,CPI,R) 1.25 0.15 1.41 0.08 0.97 0.63
(0.20) (0.17) (0.32) (0.19) (0.06) (0.26)
(hours,CPI,R) 1.28 0.10 1.47 0.005 0.96 0.65
(0.23) (0.16) (0.37) (0.17) (0.05) (0.19)
(U,PCE,R) 1.18 0.21 1.30 -0.001 0.95 0.57
(0.13) (0.14) (0.18) (0.17) (0.09) (0.13)
(hours,PCE,R) 1.18 0.22 1.34 0.001 0.91 0.66
(0.14) (0.15) (0.21) (0.16) (0.08) (0.12)
The Relative MSE and λ statistics compare inﬂation forecast performances based on
alternative kt in the following regression: fk
t : πt+12−πt = α+B(L)kt+G(L)πt+εt+12.
Inﬂa t i o ni sm e a s u r e dw i t he i t h e rt h eC P Io rP C E - d e ﬂator. In the bottomfour forecast
speciﬁcations, the current and lagged funds rate are also included as right-hand-side
variables. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedastic and serial-correlation
robust estimates.
1 Rel. MSE is the ratio of the MSE based on money growth, kt=l n ( M2t/M2t−1) and
the MSE based on the the standard Phillips curve, kt = Ut, or the log diﬀerence in hours
worked.
2 λ is estimated from a regression of the realized annual change in inﬂation on two alternative
out of sample forecasts: πt+h − πt = λfM2
t +( 1− λ)fx
t + εt+h,where x = Ut,o rt h el o g
diﬀerence in hoursPUTTING ‘M’ BACK 30
Table 3. Identifying Restrictions in Model Without Money
P P P P I MP
Y × × × × × ×
C × × × ×
U × × ×
P × × ×
CP ×
R × ×
Table 4. Identifying Restrictions in Model With Money
P P P P I I MD MP
Y × × × × × ×
C × × × × × ×
U × × × ×
P × × × ×
RM × × ×1
CP ×
M × × × ×
R × × ×1 ×
Table 5. Alternative Models of Money Market Behavior
A B C D
MD MP MD MP MD MP MD MP
Y × ×
C × × × ×
U
P × ××× ××
RM ×1 ×1 ×1
CP
M ××× ×××
R ×1 × ×1 × × ×1 ×PUTTING ‘M’ BACK 31
Table 6. Tests of Overidentifying Restrictions
1959:1-2001:6 1959:1-2001:6 1959:1-1979:9 1959:1-1982:12 1983:1-2001:6
Model (ex. 79:9-82:12)
No S 12.578 10.598 8.7182 8.5203 3.9629
Money1 SC 12.45 12.28 10.99 11.28 10.75
LR .0019 .0050 .0128 .0141 .1379
AIC 4 4 4 4 4
A2 S 16.995 12.852 8.3803 10.636 5.9146
SC 31.13 30.72 27.51 28.24 26.92
LR .0045 .0248 .1365 .0591 .3146
AIC 10 10 10 10 10
B2 S 18.559 15.002 9.4069 11.582 3.8982
SC 24.91 24.58 22.01 22.60 21.54
LR .0010 .0047 .0517 .0207 .4200
AIC 8 8 8 8 8
C2 S 24.526 16.004 9.4901 15.148 8.7202
SC 37.36 36.87 33.01 33.90 32.31
LR .0004 .0137 .1478 .0191 .1899
AIC 12 12 12 12 12
D2 S 17.04 12.807 8.3482 10.622 6.5458
SC 24.91 24.58 22.01 22.60 21.54
LR .0297 .1187 .0049 .2241 .5863
AIC 8 8 8 8 8
Rows report test statistics and criteria for tests of overidentifying restrictions: S: test statis-
tic = 2∗(lnML(unrestricted)−lnML(restricted)); SC: Schwarz Criterion = k∗ln(T);
k=no. of overidentifying restrictions; T sample size; LR: p-value from χ2(k) for likelihood
ratio test; AIC: Akaike Information Criterion = 2* k.
1 Model without money: Does not model money market behavior. M and RM excluded
from the model. Policy: R = f(P,Y).
2 Models A-D diﬀer only in their models of money market behavior; lagged coeﬃcients
identical across models. The models are:
A: Policy: R = f(M); money demand: M = g(P,C,R − RM).
B: Policy: R = f(P,Y ); money demand: M = g(P,C,R − RM).
C: Policy: R = f(M); money demand: M = g(P,C).
D: Policy: M = f(P,Y); money demand: M = g(P,C,R− RM).PUTTING ‘M’ BACK 32
Table 7. Comparing Models With and Without Money
Impacts of Policy Contraction that Raises Funds Rate by 25 Basis Points
Maximum eﬀect Total eﬀect
Sample period over 4 years on1,2 after 4 years on2
Model Y C U π3 r4 P
1959:1-2001:6
Without Money -.12 -.10 .05 -.04 .25 -.07
With Money -.33 -.28 .10 -.20 .29 -.62
1959:1-2001:6
excl. 79:10-82:12
Without Money -.15 -.11 .06 -.00 .25 .04
With Money -.42 -.35 .12 -.20 .34 -.61
1959:1-1979:9
Without Money -.25 -.19 .10 0 .25 .15
With Money -.71 -.59 .15 -.29 .54 -.87
1959:1-1982:12
Without Money -.13 -.10 .06 -.05 .25 -.11
With Money -.36 -.28 .10 -.22 .29 -.67
1983:1-2001:6
Without Money -.25 -.26 .06 -.10 .41 -.14
With Money -.43 -.47 .09 -.12 .45 -.24
Without Money: Does not model money market behavior. M and RM
excluded from the model. Policy: R = f(P,Y).
With Money: Policy responds to the money stock R = f(M) and money
demand is M = g(P,C,R − RM).
1 Maximum “correct-signed” response.
2 In percent for Y,C,P,π, and in percentage points for U,r.
3 π is monthly inﬂation at an annual rate.
4 r is the annual real interest rate, rt = Rt − πt.PUTTING ‘M’ BACK 33
Table 8. Alternative Models of Money Market Behavior
Impacts of Policy Contraction that Raises Funds Rate by 25 Basis Points
Maximum eﬀect Total eﬀect Short-run interest
Sample period over 4 years on1,2 after 4 years on2 elasticity of money3
Model Y C U π4 ˙ M4 P M demand supply
1959:1-2001:6
A -.33 -.28 .10 -.20 -2.70 -.62 -1.05 -.0127 .0014
B -.14 -.11 .05 -.04 -.32 -.08 -.07 -.0008 ∞
C -.13 -.10 .05 -.03 -.26 -.05 -.002 0 -.0298
D -.77 -.68 .20 -.58 -8.58 -1.86 -3.33 -.0484 0
1959:1-2001:6
excl. 79:10-82:12
A -.42 -.35 .12 -.20 -3.15 -.61 -1.30 -.0132 .0035
B -.20 -.14 .08 -.03 -.38 -.04 -.14 -.0011 ∞
C -.18 -.12 .07 -.01 -.33 .02 -.03 0 -.0482
D -1.25 -1.23 .30 -.85 -13.98 -2.75 -5.66 -.0773 0
1959:1-1979:9
A -.71 -.59 .15 -.29 -6.31 -.87 -1.91 -.0213 .0010
B -.29 -.23 .11 0 -.46 .15 -.15 -.0006 ∞
C -.28 -.22 .11 0 -.43 .17 -.10 0 -.0582
D -1.51 -1.25 .30 -.87 -17.25 -2.68 -5.04 -.0562 0
1959:1-1982:12
A -.36 -.28 .10 -.22 -2.60 -.67 -.89 -.0118 .0005
B -.15 -.11 .06 -.05 -.27 -.13 -.12 -.0009 ∞
C -.13 -.10 .06 -.04 -.22 -.08 -.06 0 -.0140
D -.51 -.39 .14 -.34 -4.16 -1.03 -1.39 -.0195 0
1983:1-2001:6
A -.43 -.47 .09 -.12 -1.86 -.24 -.81 -.0086 .0112
B -.26 -.27 .07 -.10 -.69 -.08 -.23 -.0013 ∞
C -.22 -.23 .07 -.10 -.65 -.05 -.12 0 -.0750
D -2.42 -2.77 .23 -.69 -19.59 -2.04 -7.46 -.2746 0
Models A-D diﬀer only in their models of money market behavior; lagged coeﬃcients
identical across models. The models are:
A: Policy: R = f(M); money demand: M = g(P,C,R− RM).
B: Policy: R = f(P,Y ); money demand: M = g(P,C,R − RM).
C: Policy: R = f(M); money demand: M = g(P,C).
D: Policy: M = f(P,Y); money demand: M = g(P,C,R− RM).
1 Maximum “correct-signed” response.
2 In percent for Y,C,P,M,π, ˙ M, and in percentage points for U.
3 Short-run elasticity is the monthly contemporaneous semi-elasticity.
4 π and ˙ M are monthly inﬂation and money growth at annual rates.PUTTING ‘M’ BACK 34
Table 9. Excluding Monetary Variables from Various Equations
Impacts of Policy Contraction that Raises Funds Rate by 25 Basis Points
When Lagged M and RM are Excluded from Various Equations
Maximum eﬀect Total eﬀect
Sample period over 4 years on1,2 after 4 years on2
Model Y C U π3 ˙ M3 R r4 P M
1959:1-2001:6
No exclusions -.33 -.28 .10 -.20 -2.70 .27 .29 -.62 -1.05
Excluded from P -.37 -.34 .11 -.13 -2.70 .27 .25 -.35 -1.00
Excluded from Y,C,U -.11 -.07 .04 -.17 -2.70 .27 .30 -.52 -.82
Excluded from Y,C,U,P -.12 -.09 .05 -.07 -2.70 .27 .25 -.17 -.72
1959:1-2001:6
ex. 79:10-82:12
No exclusions -.42 -.35 .12 -.20 -3.15 .26 .34 -.61 -1.30
Excluded from P -.47 -.41 .15 -.13 -3.15 .26 .25 -.32 -1.22
Excluded from Y,C,U -.13 -.07 .05 -.18 -3.15 .27 .35 -.52 -1.01
Excluded from Y,C,U,P -.14 -.09 .06 -.07 -3.15 .27 .25 -.13 -.86
1959:1-1979:9
No exclusions -.71 -.59 .15 -.29 -6.31 .28 .54 -.87 -1.91
Excluded from P -.84 -.71 .20 -.34 -6.31 .29 .28 -.80 -1.86
Excluded from Y,C,U -.23 -.13 .09 -.26 -6.31 .28 .53 -.55 -1.54
Excluded from Y,C,U,P -.21 -.12 .09 -.18 -6.31 .29 .28 -.40 -1.43
1959:1-1982:12
No exclusions -.36 -.28 .10 -.22 -2.60 .25 .29 -.67 -.89
Excluded from P -.38 -.31 .11 -.18 -2.60 .25 .25 -.49 -.81
Excluded from Y,C,U -.11 -.07 .05 -.17 -2.60 .25 .31 -.56 -.76
Excluded from Y,C,U,P -.10 -.07 .05 -.12 -2.60 .25 .25 -.33 -.65
1983:1-2001:6
No exclusions -.43 -.47 .09 -.12 -1.86 .33 .45 -.24 -.81
Excluded from P -.43 -.48 .09 -.10 -1.86 .33 .43 -.20 -.83
Excluded from Y,C,U -.30 -.32 .06 -.11 -1.86 .34 .44 -.20 -.67
Excluded from Y,C,U,P -.30 -.32 .07 -.10 -1.86 .34 .43 -.15 -.69
Models diﬀer only in whether lags of M and RM are excluded from various
equations in the product market. Interactions in the money market identical
across models; policy: R = f(M); money demand: M = g(P,C,R−RM).
1 Maximum “correct-signed” response.
2 In percent for Y,C,P,M,π, ˙ M, and in percentage points for U,R,r.
3 π and ˙ Ma r em o n t h l yi n ﬂation and money growth at annual rates.
4 r is the annual real interest rate, rt = Rt − πt.PUTTING ‘M’ BACK 35
Table 10. Some Nested Models of Money Market Behavior
A B Generalized
MD MP MD MP MD MP
Y × ×
C × × ×
U
P × ××××
RM ×1 ×1 ×1
CP
M ××× ××
R ×1 × ×1 × ×1 ×
Table 11. Behavioral Error Correlations Implied by Alternative Models
1959:1-2001:6 1959:1-2001:6 (excl. 79:10-82:12)
Money1 No Money2 Money1 No Money2
ε(MP) ε(MD) ε(MP) ε(MP) ε(MD) ε(MP)
ε(Y) (-.038,.049) (-.007,.062) (-.051,.039) (-.038,.023) (-.060,.014) (-.041,.052)
ε(C) (.014,.052) (-.015,.052) (-.022,.010) (-.061,.030) (-.061,.014) (.064,.096)
ε(U) (-.074,.066) (.136,.176) (.138,.168) (-.076,.097) (.010,.159) (.111,.141)
ε(P) (-.031,.004) (-.038,.051) (-.044,.046) (-.021,.024) (-.032,.062) (-.029,.065)
ε(RM) (-.039,.050) (-.020,.070) – (-.040,.051) (-.036,.056) –
ε(CP) (-.048,.038) (-.037,.050) (-.052,.036) (-.046,.044) (-.041,.049) (-.051,.040)
ε(MD) (-.042,.053) 1 – (-.033,.069) 1 –
ε(MP) 1 (-.042,.053) 1 1 (-.032,.069) 1
68% error bands for correlation between the monetary policy or money demand
shock and other shocks in system. Based on 300,000 draws.
1 Model with money: Policy: R = f(M) and money demand is M = g(P,C,R −
RM).
2 Model without money: Does not model money market behavior. M and RM
excluded from the model. Policy: R = f(P,Y).PUTTING ‘M’ BACK 36
Figure 1. Dynamic Correlations From 15-Year Moving Window of
Data. Solid lines are 1 year, 6 months, or 0 months; dashed lines are 2
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Figure 2. Impacts of Policy Contraction in Model Without Money:
1959-2001
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Figure 3. Impacts of Policy Contraction in Model With Money: 1959-2001
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Figure 4. Impacts of Money Demand Increase: 1959-2001
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Figure 5. Impacts of Policy Contraction in Models With and Without
Money. Dotted solid line, model without money; solid line. model with
money; dashed lines, 68% bands model with money.
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Figure 6. Impacts of Policy Contraction in Models A and B With
Money. Solid line is A; dashed lines 68% bands for A; dotted solid line
is B. Policy in A: R = f(M); policy in B: R = f(Y,P).
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Figure 7. Nested Models: R = f(P,Y,M), solid and dashed lines;
R = f(P,Y), dotted lines.
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Figure 8. Nested Models: R = f(M), solid and dashed lines; R =
f(P,Y,M), dotted lines.
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Figure 9. Impacts of Policy Contraction in Models With and Without
Money: 1983-2001. Dotted solid line, model without money; solid line,
model with money; dashed lines 68% bands, model with money.
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Figure 10. Inﬂation: Actual and Without Policy Shocks
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Contribution of Money Demand: Model With Money
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Figure 11. Unemployment: Actual and Without Policy Shocks
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Contribution of Money Demand: Model With Money















Contribution of Monetary Policy: Model Without Money